Prepare ms-private 0.0.1 release candidate

docs/RESEARCH.md

@@ -110,6 +110,20 @@ Exclude registry cleaners, blanket log clearing, SSD free-space wiping and RAM t
 
 WinUtil provides useful UI, app installation and reversible settings, but every preset needs review and version pinning. Do not chain multiple debloat tools on a machine. This prototype uses its own small, documented policy catalog, not an unreviewed execution of WinUtil. [WinUtil tweak guidance](https://github.com/ChrisTitusTech/winutil/blob/main/docs/src/content/docs/guides/tweaks.mdx).
 
-AME is a delivery mechanism. Its Privacy+ methodology describes removal of Windows Update, conflicting with the requirement for reversible update choices. A future Wind AME wrapper should invoke the same tested engine rather than duplicate settings or remove security services. [Privacy+ methodology](https://download.amelabs.net/Privacy%2B%20Testing%20Methodology.pdf).
+AME is a delivery mechanism. Its Privacy+ methodology describes removal of Windows Update, conflicting with the requirement for reversible update choices. The ms-private AME wrapper invokes the same tested engine rather than duplicating settings or removing security services. [Privacy+ methodology](https://download.amelabs.net/Privacy%2B%20Testing%20Methodology.pdf).
 
 For sessions requiring an amnesic environment, prefer a separate Tails USB over promises about making ordinary Windows forget everything. Persistence must remain an explicit choice. Tails still cannot guarantee safety against malicious hardware or identifying user behavior. [How Tails works](https://tails.net/about/index.en.html).
+
+## 9. Documented but easy-to-miss channels and security checks
+
+The September 2026 review found more documented surfaces that belong in a privacy model. Microsoft lists separate connections for device metadata, downloadable fonts, Windows location, Widgets and Spotlight. The optional-diagnostics schema says optional data can include browser IDs, URLs and search terms, page titles, notification text, processed typing context and recognized ink. These are not evidence of a secret backdoor; they show why one telemetry switch or one identifier cannot describe the complete data surface. [Windows 11 endpoints](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/privacy/manage-windows-11-endpoints), [optional diagnostic data](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/privacy/optional-diagnostic-data).
+
+The policy catalog now covers tailored experiences and implicit ink/typing collection for the current user; search location and dynamic highlights; Widgets; device metadata and font streaming; MSRT infection reports; and packaged-app access to location, foreground text, gaze, screen capture, human-presence sensing, motion, notifications, phone state, radios and background execution. Per-app allow overrides are treated as conflicts because a global-default label would otherwise overstate coverage. Spotlight and consumer-experience controls are selected only on Enterprise/Education, matching Microsoft's current edition support. [Privacy Policy CSP](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-privacy), [Search Policy CSP](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-search), [Experience Policy CSP](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-experience), [Widgets policy](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-newsandinterests).
+
+Strict mode disables LLMNR through the documented DNS Client policy. This reduces a local name-resolution spoofing and credential-relay surface, but it can break legacy discovery and name resolution for printers or peer devices. mDNS, NetBIOS, WPAD, file sharing and discovery remain separate research and compatibility decisions; they are not silently disabled under the Microsoft-telemetry label. [DNS Client policy](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-admx-dnsclient#pol-llmnr).
+
+The security audit now observes Defender real-time, behavior, IOAV, network-inspection and cloud settings; TPM and Secure Boot; VBS/Credential Guard; LSA protection; UAC; SMB1, signing and guest-related configuration; remote access; and the update, certificate, Defender, firewall and event-log services. It excludes Defender exclusions, account names, keys and secrets. LSA protection and Credential Guard defend credentials, while current Windows 11 releases also strengthen SMB signing. These controls need compatibility testing before enforcement, so the release audits them instead of forcing settings that might cut off NAS, domain or accessibility workflows. [Advanced credential protection](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/book/identity-protection-advanced-credential-protection), [Credential Guard](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/how-it-works/), [SMB hardening](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-security-hardening).
+
+The network catalog adds exact feature endpoints for location inference, metadata, font streaming, Widgets and Spotlight. It rejects target names under Windows Update, update delivery, Defender, SmartScreen, Store revocation and WNS families. NCSI, certificate revocation, root certificate maintenance, Windows Update, Defender and notification infrastructure remain available because blocking them can create false offline state or weaken security. A reset or feature update can also communicate before local policy is reapplied, so a high-assurance no-direct-contact design needs offline policy application or a physically/network-isolated Windows system plus a separate update collector. [Manage Windows connections](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/privacy/manage-connections-from-windows-operating-system-components-to-microsoft-services).
+
+Historical forensic research found hardware serials, external-storage traces and process-execution traces in older Windows telemetry resource files. That is a useful lab lead, not proof that the same artifacts or transmissions exist on every current build. Current claims require a named Windows build, a repeatable workflow, local and external capture, and redacted evidence. ETW patching, TLS interception and deletion of security logs are excluded because they impair defenses or create a new interception risk rather than proving privacy. [Forensic analysis of Windows telemetry](https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.12506).